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STATUTES 
Section 30-3-5, Utah Code Annotated 1953 
v 
JURISDICTION 
Appeal s has ji ir:i s :i i ctic n over this 
matter pursuant Lu U U I , «.ode Annotated, Section n^-?.(a)-
3(2 ' - this is an appeal from a final judgment and 
order *:. . domestic re] at ions action. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. c 
order the sale * property because there was no 
i. 
2. The Trial Court did not error in finding a 
value IUJ. ihe o-+ Law Saloon based upon the testimony 
presented at tr.oa, 
3. '"'"i*- Trial ':)!r:S j visioi. of The marital 
and circumstances of the parties are considered. 
4 • '" i .he 
cause of action tor tn^ uptioi: Agreement ;j t;:e appellee. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
As more fully discussed in Point T of the Argument, 
the sound discretion < + *»..> ','—,-. • "on-- ^ n establishing 
the values for asset. : .. _;• ,;. . n 
of sa Id assets wil", . \)>~ overturned unless r.ne Trial 
C c I lr I" • • * r 
abuse or discretion. Mile 52
 ta; , i ::ah Kuies or Civil 
1 
Procedure; also see authorities cited in Point I of this 
brief. 
Conclusions of Law are reviewed for correctness and 
are given no special deference on appeal. Also see 
authorities cited in Point I of this brief. 
RECORD ON APPEAL 
References to the Trial Transcript will be made as 
follows: (TT ) . References to the Findings of Fact 
entered by the Trial Court will be made as follows: (FF 
). References to exhibits entered at trial will be 
made as follows: (Ex. ) . Addenda in the brief will be 
referred to as follows: (Add. ). 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND DETERMINATIVE CASELAW 
Section 30-3-5, Utah Code Ann.: 
Section 30-3-5, Utah Code Annotated, provides 
authority to a divorce court to make equitable 
distributions of the property accumulated by the parties 
during the marriage. 
Caselaw: 
There is no specific case which is determinative of 
the issues in the case at bar. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This is an appeal from a Decree of Divorce 
entered by the Seventh Judicial District Court in and for 
2 
Grand County, State of Utah. Various Pre-Trial Hearings 
were conducted and interim orders were entered concerning 
support, property division and the control : f 1:1 le Oi 1 til aw 
Saloon operation. Trial was originally scheduled on 
L » - • . • 11 i i h i ill i I i ' I i i I n ' H i in I l i t 1 i i i . l i t t e r 
on said <JV •. although the parties and their witnesses, 
r^  r'\ witness, were present and prepared 
to proceed. By stipulation of the parties, the trial was 
reschedule^ for ar^ ^tuaily conducted Januar^  , 
^
l
-jj'^.. *;.. ....... ' racier ..:... ajL\„^:.t. i 
entered its Memorandum Decision on January b , 1995. The 
Fi nd - ; I'Vn I (lici *.' i.Ha 1 f. in I'1"!'"1) "i1 "uni - • i 
Decree of Divorce were entered on February 1995 (Add. 
Defendant /Appel lant f i l e d Notice of Appeal 11I the 
p r e s e n t case on Mai 
STATEMENT 
Appellee offers t-• following statement of relevant 
fac t s :ii i I ii '"I • ' • i e s e i : • 
1. • The Plaintiff/Appellee (hereinafter referred 
• " the Defendant/Appellant (hereinafter 
referrea Lu as .W " ^ nickname used by Defendant 
Kenneth Wayne Monders) were married on April 25, 1987 at 
Law Vegas, d-aii. ^ounty, Nevada (E E 2) 
3 
2. The parties separated in November of 1993 and 
have lived separate and apart since that time (FF3). 
3. There were no children born as issue of the 
marriage (FF5). 
4. At the time of their marriage, Cheryl was 
employed at a motel and restaurant in Moab, Utah and she 
also owned and operated a bar in Moab known as the Outlaw 
Saloon. The assets of the bar had been purchased with 
Cheryl's money. She operated the bar in a rented building 
(FF 6). 
5+ At the time of the marriage, Cheryl had 
invested about $20,000 of her money in establishing the 
original Outlaw Saloon. She also had $9,090.00 in 
currency in a safety deposit box, the sum $15,524.00 in 
a savings account at Williamsburg Bank, the sum of 
$9,000.00 in an IRA account, the sum of $685.30 in her 
checking account, an ounce of gold, motel stock worth 
$11,445.00 and a $10,000.00 tax exempt bearer bond (FF 
7). 
6. J.W. brought no assets into the marriage except 
a 1975 Thunderbird automobile and his clothing (FF 8). 
7. At the time of the marriage, J.W. was employed 
at a approximately $4.00 per hour as a janitor (TT 271). 
Following the marriage, J.W. worked regularly in the bar, 
4 
except for three (3) months when he attempted to start 
a business for himself -^ Cheryl managed and also 
i /c i: I :e ::i :i i : 11 L = 1: !a :i : • it 11 j ' t i i - . I 
8, Due to the scheduled demolition of the building 
g 
Lor an alternative cite I O I nei u a : u - i.i. on October 
^, ±y' u"r , T' contracted ' -u:rchnse : ^f faid building 
from ;^. f ^ 3 tc-Lal ccsi She paid 
$23,000 as a down paymer.' w* i rh rame from her pre-marital 
CI ler } J i i ill: ler :i ted 
$10,601 :r;:i her father's estate * iuHH and 
years from 1ler mother's estate m i *:»9J . ;r. the same day, 
her uncle granted Cheryl and J.W. an option to purchase 
an adjacent, > * provided the option was 
exercised within one ( year (FF ] 2) 
9. < .. . * . ... i.e 
existing building to cieate a place for the operation of 
1 11 > I 1 I m1" I I I I I I  I  in ' r$-n\\t n i p 1 j n q | m l ' m< ' ( | i i |«i r l w.i | y I  "  .3 
pre-marita- ur inherited properLy i Ft u ) . 
Cheryl had incorporated the Outlaw Saloon i n 
19 . is its sole shareholder and, in exchange for 
the shares, she conveyed all of r.h< oroperty and assets 
of tJI: 1 E: :: i :i gi i la 1 Oi i t ] e i < 3 a :i ::1 3 0 1 porati 01 1. 
Throughout the marriage, she has remained the sole owner 
of all of the shares of the corporation (FF 14). 
11. In an attempt to get some contribution from 
J.W., Cheryl entered into a written agreement on March 
2, 1992 whereby she agreed to sell one-half of the 
business and property known as The Outlaw Saloon to J.W. 
The agreement estimates the value of Cheryl's investment 
in the business and property at $60,000 and provides for 
J.W. to buy a one-half interest in same for $30,000 under 
terms and conditions outlined in the agreement (FF 21). 
The agreement was breached by both parties but the Court 
found the agreement helpful in determining the state of 
mind of the parties in valuing their assets prior to the 
commencement of the divorce action (FF 22). 
12. Every tax return showed Cheryl as the sole 
proprietor of the bar before its incorporation and every 
tax return showed Cheryl as the sole owner of the 
corporation and the person responsible for filing the 
corporate tax returns after the corporation was created 
(FF 16). 
13. At the time of the entry of the Decree of 
Divorce, The Outlaw Saloon building was providing living 
quarters for Cheryl and it also provided her sole source 
6 
of employment (TT 205). J.W. was residing in Salt Lake 
City and was employed there (TT 275-276). 
14. The Court found that the value of The Outlaw 
Saloon was $155,000. The parties still owed Cheryl's 
uncle $43,000 (FF 23). The net value of The Outlaw Saloon 
operation was the sum of $112,000. The Court found that 
Cheryl had invested $60,000 of her separate pre-marital 
or inherited property in the business as of March of 1993 
(FF 25). The Court found that she should recover all of 
that investment (FF 25). 
15. The Court found that the bar has been a joint 
marital venture but that Cheryl alone had made a 
substantial financial investment in that venture (FF 22). 
The Court found that the bar was a marital asset but that 
an equitable distribution would require that Cheryl 
receive more than one-half of that asset (FF 22) . 
Additionally, the Court found that there were two (2) 
significant factors which also required a less than even 
distribution of the asset, namely, that Cheryl was 51 
years old and suffered from an injury that had seriously 
limited her ability to work while J.W. was 38 years old, 
able-bodied and did not have as great a need for the 
marital assets as did Cheryl (FF 26). Additionally, the 
actual increase in the value of the business operation 
7 
was attributable to the increased property values in 
Grand County which had occurred as a result of economic 
changes in the area rather than the efforts of the 
parties themselves (FF 26). 
16. Cheryl had $11,000 in contributions and 
accumulated interest in her IRA account during the 
marriage. One-half of the amount of the IRA account was 
awarded to J.W., namely $5,500.00 (FF 28 and 29). 
17. J.W. was awarded one-fourth (1/4) of the 
increased equity in The Outlaw Saloon operation and its 
property which was the sum of $13,000. Cheryl was awarded 
three-fourths (3/4) of the increased equity (FF 26 and 
27) . 
18. The Court awarded J.W. a total property 
settlement in the sum of $18,500.00 bearing interest at 
the legal rate of seven (7%) percent per annum from 
January 1, 1995 until fully paid. The Court secured the 
property settlement against the real estate and set 
payments at the rate of $250.00 per month, amortized over 
eight (8) years (FF 29). 
19. Although the parties may initially have had a 
chance of legally compelling Cheryl's uncle to consummate 
the sale of the adjacent lot, prospects of success were 
dimmed by their failure to pursue their claim. The Court 
8 
found that their claim to the adjacent lot had little or 
no value and awarded the claim to Cheryl because she had 
the best chance of being able to deal with her uncle for 
the adjacent lot, she had been awarded the building which 
partially encroached onto the lot, and she was currently 
renting the lot (FF 24). 
20. The Trial Court entered its Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce on February 17, 
1995. 
21. J.W.'s Notice of Appeal was timely filed. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Trial Court did not impose sanctions or order 
the sale of the property because there was no 
justification or reason for so doing. Appellant contends 
that he was unfairly prejudiced at trial because, during 
his cross-examination of the Appellee, she testified that 
she desired not to sell The Outlaw Saloon. Since her 
"desires" are immaterial to the determination of the 
value of The Outlaw Saloon as of the date of the trial, 
and since no sanctions, continuances or requests for the 
sale of property were even made to the Trial Court, there 
can be no basis for imposing sanctions or ordering a sale 
of the property. 
9 
The Trial Court received testimony concerning the 
value of The Outlaw Saloon property and the lack of value 
associated with bar type businesses in Moab, Utah. The 
trial testimony was consistent with all of the 
information provided by the Appellee during responses to 
discovery. The Appellant failed to provide any testimony 
concerning the value of the business and/or the real 
estate upon which same was located, claiming that he 
"assumed" that some future sale of the property might be 
used to establish a value. Since the Trial Court has to 
establish a value at the time of the Decree in order to 
determine an equitable distribution of assets, the Trial 
Court did not error in setting the values based upon the 
only competent testimony presented at trial. 
The Trial Court's division of marital assets was 
equitable when the comparative contributions and 
circumstances of the parties were taken into 
consideration. The Appellee is 51 years old and suffers 
from a severe injury which affects her earning capacity. 
She also provided all of the investment capital that 
developed the business. The Appellant is 38 years of age, 
able-bodied, employed and contributed nothing by way of 
investment capital to the business. The Trial Court's 
10 
division cannot be found to be an abuse of discretion 
and, therefore, should be affirmed. 
The Trial Court did not error in granting the 
Appellee the cause of action for the Option Agreement. 
The cause of action had little or no value. The property 
was owned by the Appellee's uncle. Appellee was awarded 
the adjacent property and the building which encroached 
upon the optioned land. At the time of Trial she was 
renting the optioned property and paying consideration 
therefore. The Trial Court's award cannot be found to be 
clearly erroneous and, therefore, should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
SINCE THE APPELLANT FAILED TO MARSHAL ALL OF THE EVIDENCE 
WHICH SUPPORTED THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT AND, 
DESPITE SUCH EVIDENCE, DEMONSTRATE THAT THE FINDINGS WERE 
CLEARLY ERRONEOUS, THE APPELLATE COURT SHOULD REFUSE TO 
CONSIDER AN ATTACK ON THE TRIAL COURT'S DISTRIBUTION OF 
PROPERTY. 
A review of Appellant's argument indicates that the 
Appellant is really attacking the Trial Court's Findings 
of Fact and not just its Conclusions of Law. The Trial 
Court entered numerous and express Findings of Fact in 
the case at bar. Those Findings should be reviewed in 
light of the guidelines found in Rule 52(a), Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. Rule 52(a) provides, in relevant 
part, as follows: 
11 
Rule 52: Findings by the Court. 
(a) Effect. In all actions tried 
upon the facts without a jury..., the 
court shall find the facts specially and 
state separately its conclusions of law 
thereon, and judgment shall be entered 
pursuant to Rule 58A;...Findings of Fact, 
whether based on oral or documentary 
evidence, shall not be set aside unless 
clearly erroneous, and due regard shall 
be given to the opportunity of the trial 
court to judge the credibility of the 
witnesses. The findings of a master, to 
the extent that the court adopts them, 
shall be considered as the findings of 
the court. It will be sufficient if the 
findings of fact and conclusions of law 
are stated orally and recorded in open 
court following the close of the evidence 
or appear in an opinion or memorandum of 
decision filed by the court... 
[Emphasis added by Order of the 
Utah Supreme Court on October 
30, 1986 and became effective 
on January 1, 1987.] 
An analysis of the 1987 modification of Rule 52(a) 
demonstrates a clear intent to avoid retrying the facts 
of the case at the Appellate level. Since a divorce 
action is an equitable case, the Trial Courts have been 
given broad discretion in making awards. Riche v. Riche, 
784 P.2d 465 (Utah App. 1989); Sukin v. Sukin, 842 P.2d 
922 (Utah App. 1992); Maughan v. Maughan, 770 P.2d 156 
(Utah App. 1989); Myers v. Myers, 768 P.2d 979 (Utah App. 
1989); Shioji v. Shioji, 712 P.2d 197 (Utah 1985). 
Appellate Courts have traditionally granted great 
deference to the Trial Court's Findings of Fact and do 
12 
not overturn them unless they are clearly erroneous. The 
Appellate Courts accord substantial deference to the 
Trial Court's Findings and give the Trial Court 
considerable latitude in fashioning an appropriate 
relief. Watson v. Watson, 837 P.2d 1 (Utah App. 1992); 
Woodward v. Woodward, 709 P.2d 393 (Utah 1985). 
Additionally, Appellate Courts have traditionally 
deferred to the Trial Court for purposes of judging the 
credibility of witnesses. Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure; Myers, supra; Shioji, supra; Riche, supra. 
In Riche v. Riche, supra, this Court stated: 
Husband, in his brief on appeal, refers 
this court to evidence which conflicts 
with the trial court's findings and 
supports his contention that he should 
have been awarded custody of the four 
children. However, Husband does not 
"marshal the evidence in support of the 
findings and then demonstrate that 
despite this evidence, the trial court's 
findings are so lacking in support as to 
be N against the clear weight of the 
evidence,' thus making them %clearly 
erroneous.'" Bartell, 776 P.2d at 886 
(quoting Walker, 743 P.2d at 193). See 
also Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 
1070 (Utah 1985); Harker v. Condominiums 
Forest Glen, Inc., 740 P.2d 1361, 1362 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987). Therefore, we 
decline to further consider Husband's 
attack on the court's findings as to 
custody. (Riche, supra p. 468). [Emphasis 
added]. 
In Shioji, the Supreme Court has also expressly 
provided: 
13 
On appeal from a judgment of the Trial 
Court, our [Appellate Court] role is not 
to substitute our own findings for those 
of the Trial Court, but to examine the 
record for evidence supporting the 
j udgment. 
(Shioji, supra, at 201) [Emphasis added] 
Given that express statement of the role of the 
Appellate Court, the Appellant is charged with the 
responsibility of (1) marshaling all the evidence in 
support of the Findings, and (2) demonstrating that, 
despite that evidence, the Trial Court's Findings are so 
lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of 
the evidence. 
In the case at bar, J.W. contends that the Trial 
Court erred in establishing its valuation of The Outlaw 
Saloon, in its division of the marital assets and in its 
award of the cause of action for the option property to 
Cheryl. A review of J.W.'s actual argument (more fully 
discussed in Points II through V of this brief) reveals 
that J.W. is actually attacking the Findings of Fact of 
the Trial Court and, therefore, he has not applied the 
proper Standard of Review. He has not marshaled all of 
the evidence which was presented to the Trial Court nor 
made any attempt to evaluate the Court's reasoning nor 
has he demonstrated that the reasoning or the Findings 
based thereon were clearly erroneous. Since the Appellant 
14 
has failed to marshal all of the evidence and, despite 
such evidence, demonstrate that the Court's Findings 
concerning the valuation of the marital assets and the 
distribution of same were clearly erroneous, this Court 
should refuse to consider any further attack on the Trial 
Court's award of said items. Hagan v. Hagan, 810 P.2d 
478 (Utah App. 1991). 
Conclusions of Law are reviewed for correctness and 
are given no special deference on appeal. Howell v. 
Howell, 806 P.2d 1209 (Utah App. 1991); Smith v. Smith, 
793 P.2d 407 (Utah App. 1990). 
II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT IMPOSE SANCTIONS OR ORDER THE 
SALE OF PROPERTY BECAUSE THERE WAS NO JUSTIFICATION TO 
DO SO. 
The Appellant J.W. contends that he was unfairly 
prejudiced at trial because the Appellee Cheryl testified 
that she did not desire to sell the Outlaw Saloon. An 
examination of the actual facts of the case demonstrates 
that the Appellant's position is incorrect. J.W. 
submitted numerous rounds of discovery in this case. 
Cheryl responded to the first set of interrogatories and 
then a second set of interrogatories. In the Second Set 
of Interrogatories, Interrogatory No. 19 asked, "describe 
in detail all efforts undertaken by you, or anyone on 
15 
your behalf, to sell, or offer for sale, the business 
known as The Outlaw Saloon, and the real property on 
which the Outlaw Saloon is located..." (Add. B). Cheryl 
indicated that she had told many people that the business 
would be for sale upon the completion of the divorce. In 
Interrogatory 20 she was asked "please identify any 
appraisals, property evaluations or re-evaluations 
conducted on the real property and the business known as 
The Outlaw Saloon..." (Add. B) . In responding Cheryl 
referred to work previously done by Bob Muir which had 
set a value of the business and property at between 
$150,000 and $160,000. It expressly made reference to the 
fact that the business portion was worth only 6% of one 
year's profit (Add. B Interrogatory 20). Mr. Muir died 
and was not available for trial. In Interrogatory 16 of 
said second set, Cheryl had designated Joe Kingsley as 
an expert with respect to the market value of The Outlaw 
Saloon (Add. B Interrogatory 16). Additionally, Plaintiff 
provided information concerning the valuation of the 
business by Joe Kingsley as soon as it was available 
which was prior to the originally scheduled trial date 
on December 2, 1994. J.W.'s counsel acknowledges that he 
had that information when he cross-examined Joe Kingsley 
at the time of trial (TT 21, 25). Mr. Kingsleyfs 
16 
testimony established a valuation of the real estate 
package at approximately $155,000. He then went on to 
indicate that while he had not examined the business 
records to value the business itself, bar businesses in 
Moab had very little value (TT 12-13, 28-29, 32-34). 
Additionally, in Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's 
Second Request for Admissions (Add. C) , Cheryl stated 
that she was "willing to sell the business known as The 
Outlaw Saloon, including all of the personal property 
used in said business, together with the real estate on 
which the business is located and all of her rights to 
the option agreement for sums between $150,000 and 
$175,000 provided that certain problems concerning title 
to the adjacent piece of property upon which a portion 
of the bar actually sits could be resolved for various 
sums of money (See Add. C Admission 1-3). All of this 
information was disclosed by Cheryl well in advance of 
trial. From the discovery it was clearly understood that 
Cheryl had consulted with experts and was prepared to use 
them at trial and that she believed that the business and 
all of its properties, including the real estate and the 
Option Agreement, would value between $150,000 and 
$160,000. Cheryl stated nothing at trial or in her case-
17 
in-chief that changed any of the information that had 
been provided during discovery. 
During cross-examination, J.Wfs attorney questioned 
Cheryl concerning her desires about selling the business. 
At that time, Cheryl testified that she did not want to 
sell the business because it was her only form of support 
(TT 205). Those remarks were elicited by J.W.'s counsel 
during cross-examination. At that time, counsel expressed 
surprise (TT 205-210). The Court asked why this was 
relevant and gave a substantial lecture about the need 
for each of the parties to present their own evidence (TT 
205-210). The Court expressly asked J.W.fs counsel what 
he wanted to do (TT 209). At no time was a continuance 
requested, contrary to the statements now made in the 
appeal brief. At no time were sanctions requested, as now 
indicated in the appeal brief. At no time was a finding 
of contempt requested, contrary to the statements now 
made in the appeal brief. No request for an order forcing 
the sale of the property was ever made. The only thing 
requested by J.W. was that the Court consider Cheryl's 
changes in testimony as affecting Cheryl's credibility 
(TT 205-210). 
As pointed out by the Trial Judge (TT 208), the 
purpose of the trial is to establish the value of the 
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assets, to determine whether portions thereof are pre-
marital or marital, and to make an equitable distribution 
of same. The judge expressly asked why some future sale 
of the property would be relevant to any of those issues 
(TT 205-210) • J.W. never established any need for or 
relevance of some future sale for the property. 
In reality, both parties entered the Courtroom on 
the day of trial knowing that the caselaw required them 
to establish the value of the assets as of the date of 
the divorce. Howell, supra. Each party has the burden of 
proof to go forward with his or her case and establish 
the value of the assets, the character of same and an 
equitable distribution. J.W. now contends that he was 
surprised because he expected that the Court would order 
a sale of the property. Some future sale which may not 
have occurred for years, would not have given the Court 
the information it needed as of the date of the trial. 
The existence of a future buyer, or the lack thereof, the 
economic conditions at the time of some future sale, the 
distress or lack thereof of the parties, all such matters 
could affect a future sale and yet none would have any 
bearing on the value of the property at the time of the 
divorce and the trial judge so noted (TT 205-210) . 
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Cheryl offered the testimony of Joe Kingsley at the 
time of trial. Mr. Kingsley established a valuation for 
the real estate. He also testified that bar businesses 
in Moab had little, if any, value. The extensive 
discovery which had been provided by Cheryl was 
consistent with all the testimony which was offer in 
Cheryl's case-in-chief. 
Irrespective of any sale, J.W. had no evidence to 
contradict anything that had been offered by Cheryl in 
her case-in-chief. He offered no evidence of the value 
the business. He offered no evidence of the value the 
real estate. He offered no expert to evaluate the 
likelihood of success of a legal action concerning the 
option property. In short, J. W. offered no case at all. 
Even his own testimony was filled with contradiction and 
was woefully lacking in any documentary evidence at all. 
He could not even identify his own tax returns (TT 2 61) . 
Since Cheryl had fully responded to all of the 
discovery requests put to her and since nothing was said 
in her case-in-chief which altered the discovery 
materials in any way, there was no reason for the Court 
to determine that she had failed to fully cooperate in 
discovery. Rule 26(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
only requires that responses to discovery be supplemented 
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if a party knows that a response, though correct when 
made, is no longer true and "the circumstances are such 
that a failure to amend the response is in substance a 
knowing concealment". The fact that Cheryl testified 
during cross- examination that she did not want to sell 
the bar because it was her only source of income does not 
constitute a "knowing concealment" within the meaning of 
Rule 26(e). In fact, J.W.'s counsel himself solicited 
those remarks. Had he not done so, there would have been 
nothing in the record indicating that she desired or did 
not desire to sell the property. Either way, it was 
immaterial as the Court could have ordered a sale of the 
property had it been necessary or advisable, irrespective 
of the desires of the parties. 
J.W. then tries to disguise his own lack of 
preparation by claiming that Cheryl was "springing" this 
evidence on him at trial. How could Cheryl have ever 
anticipated that her husband would come to trial with no 
expert witnesses or evidence to establish the value of 
the assets, considering that all of the caselaw required 
him to do so in order to carry his burden of proof if he 
contended that the value of the business was anything 
different than that disclosed by Cheryl during discovery? 
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J.W. contends that because he believed both parties 
wanted to sell the property "it was only logical to 
assume that the best way to optimize the value of the 
assets was to put them on the market" (Appellant's Brief 
at pg. 13). Such logic ignores the fact that the Trial 
Court had to establish the value of the property at the 
time of trial in order to be able to determine an 
equitable distribution of same (Howell, supra). J.W.'s 
"logical assumption" was based upon his mistaken beliefs 
that he was going to get half of the value of the 
property and that the property might sell within some 
reasonably foreseeable time period. From the evidence, 
it was much more likely that the Court would find that 
J.W. had little or no marital interest in The Outlaw 
Saloon and, therefore, it would have been totally 
unnecessary to order a sale, particularly a forced sale 
which could have driven the value even lower. 
Appellee agrees that the cases cited by the 
Appellant are an expression of the caselaw, although 
somewhat outdated, as it applies to specific fact 
situations. Appellee contends, however, that the facts 
in the cited cases are not material to the issues in this 
case. In Preston v. Preston, 646 P.2d 705 (Utah 1982), 
the Supreme Court was dealing with a case that involved 
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a finding of contempt by the Trial Court. There was no 
finding that Cheryl committed any contempt in the case 
at bar and, in fact, J.W. never even requested such a 
finding. J.W. contends that Read v. Read, 594 P.2d 871 
(Utah 1979), requires the Appellate Court to remand this 
case for the taking of further evidence; however, the 
Read case does not stand for such a proposition. In Read 
the Appellate Court found that the Trial Court's property 
award might reflect a degree of punishment against the 
husband for his extramarital conduct. That belief was 
based upon a very disparate and apparently inequitable 
division of the assets which awarded the wife over 90% 
of clearly marital assets. The case has no application 
to the case at bar as no issues of punitive awards or 
extramarital conduct were raised and any disparity in the 
distribution of property was justified at length by the 
Trial Court. J.W. then cites Naranjo v. Naranjo, 751 P.2d 
1144 (Utah App. 1988). He contends that Naranjo requires 
an Appellate Court to make changes in the Trial Court's 
ruling if there was a misunderstanding or misapplication 
of law resulting in substantial and prejudicial error. 
J.W. has failed to establish that anything in the Trial 
Court's decision was based upon a substantial or 
prejudicial error or an abuse of discretion. Indeed, none 
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of the fact situations in the cases cited by the 
Appellant have any bearing at all on the fact situation 
in the case at bar. 
Cheryl presented a coherent case-in-chief at the 
time of trial. She offered expert testimony and 
substantial documentation to support her position. She 
established and traced a considerable amount of pre-
marital property into the assets being valued by the 
Court. The Court found that it was equitable to return 
her investment to her and give her a proportional share 
of the appreciation on her investment which had occurred 
due primarily to the economy (See, Burke v. Burke, 733 
P.2d 133 (Utah 1987) wherein the Supreme Court affirmed 
the Trial Court award to the wife of all of the 
appreciated value of her sole and separate property even 
though the appreciation had occurred during the marriage 
because it resulted primarily from economic changes). The 
Court entered findings that established the value of the 
assets. Those values were consistent with all of the 
evidence and with the material that had been provided by 
Cheryl during discovery. 
By contrast, J.W. offered himself. He testified that 
his sparkling personality had built the business and was 
justification for an award of one-half of the entire 
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value of the business (TT 250) . He offered nothing else. 
He acknowledged that he came into the marriage with 
nothing and that he never contributed any money or 
property to the enterprise at all (TT 53-54; 264-265). 
The Court awarded him one-fourth of the appreciation of 
the business property and one-half of the marital 
contributions to Cheryl's IRA account by way of a 
property award. Such an award actually exceeds the 
evidence presented by J.W. at the time of trial. The 
Court entered the only reasonable findings it could have 
entered given the complete lack of preparation and 
testimony offered by J.W. at trial. 
Ill 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERROR IN FINDING A VALUE FOR THE 
OUTLAW SALOON BASED UPON THE TESTIMONY PRESENTED AT 
TRIAL. 
Appellant is required to marshal all of the evidence 
in favor of the Trial Court's Findings of Fact and, 
having done so, he is further charged with the 
responsibility of demonstrating that the Findings were 
clearly erroneous. In the case at bar, J.W. has not only 
failed to marshal all of the evidence but has actually 
ignored it. The Court entered the following Findings of 
Fact with respect to the valuation of The Outlaw Saloon 
and the property upon which it was located (Add. A): 
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FF 12 On October 2, 1990, Cheryl contracted to 
purchase a building lot from her uncle 
for $23,000 down and the balance of 
$57,000 to be financed at the rate of 10% 
per annum over ten years. (The balance of 
this Finding is omitted as it does not 
expressly deal with the valuation of the 
real estate). 
FF 13 Cheryl then began to remodel and improve 
the existing building to create a place 
to operate her bar. All of the remodeling 
funds came from Cheryl's pre-marital or 
inherited property. 
FF 21 On March 2, 1992, Cheryl and J.W. signed 
an agreement. That agreement estimated 
Cheryl's investment in the business at 
$60,000 and provided that J.W. would 
reimburse her for one-half of that amount 
or the sum of $30,000. (The balance of 
this Finding is omitted as it is not 
applicable to the issue of valuation). 
FF 23 Cheryl's evidence about the value of the 
Outlaw Saloon was not countered by 
evidence from J.W. Cheryl's expert opined 
that the total value of the property is 
ONE HUNDRED FIFTY-FIVE THOUSAND 
($155,000.00) DOLLARS. The Court accepts 
this value. Cheryl and J.W. still owe her 
uncle FORTY-THREE THOUSAND ($43,000.00) 
DOLLARS for the property. 
FF 25 The Court finds that the net value of all 
of these assets (refers to last sentence 
in preceding Finding) is the sum of 
$112,000. 
FF 26(B) Most, if not all, of the appreciation in 
the value of the business and property is 
due to an overall increase in Moab 
property values and not to any efforts of 
either party to make the business a 
success. In fact, bars like The Outlaw 
Saloon are not a "growth industry" in 
26 
Moab today. The bar is worth more mainly 
because the land on which it sits has 
become more valuable due to the economic 
changes in the area. 
After reviewing the Court's Findings of Fact, it is 
next necessary to determine whether any evidence exists 
to support the Findings. If such evidence exists, the 
Findings should not be disturbed. The parties purchased 
the property in the fall of 1990 for a total purchase 
price of $80,000 (TT 103-108; Ex 13). The $23,000 used 
as the down payment came from Cheryl's sole and separate 
property (TT 103-108) as did the remodeling funds (TT 
118-119). Cheryl included all of those funds when she 
determined that she had invested $60,000 into the 
business and property at the time she entered the written 
contract with J.W. which would have allowed him to 
purchase one-half of the business and property (TT 129-
133) . Joe Kingsley testified that the property and the 
building had a market value of $155,000 (TT 20, 40). He 
went on to testify that the bar itself had very little 
value in Moab (TT 31/34) . He provided testimony as to his 
experience as a bar owner as well as his involvement as 
a real estate agent handling properties where bars were 
located (TT 12-14) . Even with the remodeling, the 
building was only worth $10,000 (TT 20). Plaintiff's 
Response to Defendant's Second Request for Admissions 
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also established values for the "business known as The 
Outlaw Saloon, including all of the personal property 
used in said business, together with the real estate on 
which the business is located, and the rights of the 
option agreement,'' for total sums that would have netted 
approximately $150,000, depending upon the status of 
title to the adjacent property and the costs associated 
with same (Add. C, Admissions 1-3). Additionally, 
Plaintiff's Answers to Defendant's Second Set of 
Interrogatories provided in answer to Interrogatory No. 
20 that Bob Muir had valued the entire property and 
business at between $150,000 to $160,000 and that the 
business portion would be worth approximately 6% of one 
year's profits which would have placed a very low 
valuation on the business portion as the tax returns in 
evidence clearly demonstrate that the business had very 
little profit (TT 31-34; Exhibits P 16, P 26-30). 
Even without reviewing Cheryl's own testimony, the 
overview outlined above shows evidence which supports the 
Trial Court's Findings of Fact with respect to the 
valuation of the enterprise known as The Outlaw Saloon 
and its properties. J.W. offered nothing in rebuttal. 
Whether the property might have been sold or not sold at 
some point in the future, the Court still needed evidence 
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of value at the time of the entry of the Decree of 
Divorce (Howell, supra). No Court can be expected to come 
up with an equitable division when it cannot establish 
a value for the property. 
If J.W. had been so concerned about a sale of the 
property and felt it could not be valued without a sale, 
then he should have raised a motion for the sale of same 
at the time of the origin of the case approximately one 
year before the actual trial date. J.W. knew the property 
was not on the market for sale and he had made no attempt 
to request same. He knew when he entered the Courtroom 
for the first scheduled trial on December 2, 1994 as well 
as the actual trial date of January 3, 1995, that no sale 
was pending and yet he was not prepared to offer the 
Court one scintilla of evidence to establish a value. 
Since the Appellant has failed to marshal all of the 
evidence in support of the Trial Court's Findings of Fact 
and, despite such evidence, demonstrate that the Findings 
were clearly erroneous, the Trial Court's Findings with 
respect to the valuation of the enterprise known as The 
Outlaw Saloon and its properties should be affirmed. 
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IV 
THE TRIAL COURT'S DIVISION OF MARITAL ASSETS IS EQUITABLE 
WHEN THE COMPARATIVE CONTRIBUTIONS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF 
THE PARTIES ARE CONSIDERED. 
The Trial Court's division of assets was based upon 
specific Findings of Fact which are deemed to be accurate 
unless proven clearly erroneous. Appellant has failed to 
marshal any of the facts that supported the Trial Court's 
Findings and thus its division of assets. Instead, his 
brief has concentrated on controverted testimony and 
self-serving conclusionary language that he made 
"substantial contributions", that he spent "a very 
substantial portion of the marriage working full time or 
nearly so", that it was "uncontroverted at trial" that 
he devoted a substantial portion of his time to the 
business (Appellant's Brief p. 16-17). In reality, the 
evidence supports none of those statements. 
Cheryl testified that the Defendant rarely worked 
more than 20 to 25 hours a week when he was at the 
business (TT 59-60). She also testified that he had a 
negative impact on the business and often angered people. 
Only the Defendant seemed to think that his charming 
personality was the basis for the business (TT 250) . The 
only uncontroverted facts at trial were the facts that 
J.W. came into the marriage with the clothes on his back 
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and an 11 year-old car and that he never put one dime 
into any asset in this marriage (TT 53-54, 216-217, 264-
265). Appellant's failure to marshal all the evidence in 
support of the Court's Findings should require that this 
Court refuse to consider his attack upon the Trial 
Court's Findings any further (Hagan, supra). 
In the alternative, a review of the Trial Court's 
Findings of Fact offers the following with respect to the 
issue of the distribution of property: 
FF 2 The parties were married on the 25th day 
of April, 1987 at Las Vegas, Clark 
County, State of Nevada and have been 
husband and wife since that date. 
FF 3 The parties separated on or about 
November, 1993 and have lived separate 
and apart since that time. 
FF 6 At the time of their marriage, the 
Plaintiff (hereinafter called "Cheryl") 
was employed at a motel and restaurant in 
Moab, Utah and she also owned and 
operated a bar in Moab known as the 
Outlaw Saloon. The assets of the bar had 
been purchased with Cheryl's money. She 
operated the bar in a rented building. 
FF 7 At the time of the marriage, Cheryl had 
invested about TWENTY THOUSAND 
($20,000.00) DOLLARS of her money in 
establishing the original Outlaw Saloon. 
She also had NINE THOUSAND NINETY 
($9,090.00) DOLLARS in currency in a 
safety deposit box, the sum of FIFTEEN 
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED TWENTY-FOUR 
($15,524.00) DOLLARS in a savings account 
at Williamsburg Bank, the sum of NINE 
THOUSAND ($9,000.00) DOLLARS in an 
individual retirement account, the sum of 
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SIX HUNDRED EIGHTY-FIVE DOLLARS THIRTY 
CENTS ($685.30) in her checking account, 
an ounce of gold, motel stock worth 
ELEVEN THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE 
($11,445.00) DOLLARS and a TEN THOUSAND 
($10,000.00) DOLLAR tax exempt bearer 
bond. 
FF 8 The Defendant (hereinafter called "J.W.") 
brought no assets into the marriage 
except a 1975 Thunderbird automobile and 
his clothing. 
FF 9 At the time of the marriage, Cheryl's 
employer was providing meals, lodging and 
health insurance for her as a benefit of 
her employment. After the marriage, those 
benefits continued and were also extended 
to J.W. as a benefit of Cheryl's 
employment. 
FF 10 A few months before the marriage, J.W. 
terminated his minimum wage employment as 
a custodian for another motel and began 
working in the bar. From that point 
forward, J.W. worked regularly in the 
bar, except for three (3) months when he 
attempted to start a business for 
himself. He continued to work in the bar 
until the parties separated in November 
of 1993. Cheryl managed and also worked 
in the bar during the same period of 
time. 
FF 12 On October 2, 1990, Cheryl contracted to 
purchase a lot and building from her 
uncle for TWENTY-THREE THOUSAND 
($23,000.00) DOLLARS down and the balance 
of FIFTY-SEVEN THOUSAND ($57,000.00) 
DOLLARS to be financed at the rate of ten 
(10%) percent per annum over ten (10) 
years. J.W. was a party to the contract 
but furnished none of the down payment. 
The down payment came from the pre-
marital and inherited property of Cheryl. 
(Cheryl inherited SIXTEEN THOUSAND SIX 
HUNDRED ($16,600.00) DOLLARS in cash from 
her father's estate in 1988 and THREE 
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THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED SIXTEEN 
($3,316.00) DOLLARS in cash plus a right 
to ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY-THREE ($183.00) 
DOLLARS per month for seven (7) years 
from her mother's estate in 1991.) On the 
same day, the uncle granted Cheryl and 
J.W. an option to purchase the adjacent 
lot for TEN THOUSAND ($10,000.00) 
DOLLARS. Said option was to be exercised 
within one (1) year. 
FF 13 Cheryl then began to remodel and improve 
the existing building to create a place 
to operate her bar. All of the remodeling 
funds came from Cheryl's pre-marital or 
inherited property. 
FF 14 Cheryl had incorporated the Outlaw Saloon 
in 1988. She was its sole shareholder 
and, in exchange for the shares, she had 
conveyed all of the property and assets 
of the original Outlaw Saloon into said 
corporation. Throughout the marriage, she 
has remained the sole owner of all of the 
shares of said corporation. 
FF 15 Cheryl loaned the remodeling funds to the 
corporation from her sole and separate 
property. Cheryl claims to have loaned a 
total of FIFTY-SEVEN THOUSAND 
($57,000.00) DOLLARS to the corporation 
for the remodeling. However, the 1991 
corporate tax returns list stockholder 
loans to the corporation of only TWENTY-
FIVE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED ($25,500.00) 
DOLLARS as of the end of 1991. Cheryl has 
presented no other documentation of that 
investment. Cheryl has shown that she 
sold her motel stock in 1991, presumably 
to finance the remodeling effort. At the 
time of its sale, the motel stock was 
worth FIFTEEN THOUSAND ($15,000.00) 
DOLLARS. 
FF 16 J.W. and Cheryl filed joint tax returns 
for 1987 through 1992 and Cheryl filed 
corporate tax returns from 1989 through 
1992. Every tax return showed Cheryl as 
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the sole proprietor of the bar before its 
incorporation and the sole owner of the 
corporation after its creation. Cheryl is 
the only shareholder in the corporation 
although J.W. served as a director and a 
nominal secretary. 
FF 18 The new bar included living quarters for 
Cheryl and J.W. During the course of the 
marriage, J.W.'s meals, lodging, 
insurance and transportation needs were 
provided as a condition of Cheryl's 
employment or in conjunction with the 
operation of the business. J.W. received 
no separate compensation until 1989 for 
his work in the business. 
FF 21 On March 2, 1992, Cheryl and J.W. signed 
an agreement. That agreement estimated 
Cheryl's investment in the business at 
SIXTY THOUSAND ($60,000.00) DOLLARS and 
provided that J.W. would reimburse her 
for one-half of that amount or the sum of 
THIRTY THOUSAND ($30,000.00) DOLLARS. The 
agreement also divided responsibility for 
the operation of the bar, set salaries 
for Cheryl and J.W., and outlined a means 
for preserving the marital union. J.W. 
did not make more than the first few 
payments under this agreement and did not 
sell his trailer and pay over the 
proceeds as he had agreed. He explained 
this breach as a natural consequence of 
the failure of the corporation to pay all 
of the salary provided by the agreement. 
FF 22 The 1992 agreement is not useful as a 
legal document because it was breached by 
both parties. Agreements between the 
parties to a marriage are not usually 
binding on a divorce court. (Antenuptial 
and postnuptial agreements can be 
enforceable in Utah but only under 
conditions that this agreement made no 
effort to meet.) The agreement is most 
helpful as an expression of the states of 
mind of Cheryl and J.W. at a time when 
the pre-divorce legal posturing had not 
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yet begun. The agreement reflects a 
recognition by both parties that the bar 
has been a joint marital venture but that 
Cheryl alone had made a substantial 
financial investment in that venture. 
Based on this agreement and the 
circumstances outlined above, the Court 
finds that the bar is a marital asset but 
that equitable division will require that 
Cheryl receive more than one-half of this 
marital asset. 
FF 25 The Court finds that the net value of all 
of these assets is the sum of ONE HUNDRED 
TWELVE THOUSAND ($112,000.00) DOLLARS. 
Cheryl had invested SIXTY THOUSAND 
($60,000.00) DOLLARS of her separate pre-
marital or inherited property in the 
business as of March 1993. The Court 
finds that she is entitled to recover all 
of that investment. The Court must then 
determine an equitable distribution for 
the remaining value of the property. 
FF 26 The usual presumption is that marital 
property should be divided equally after 
pre-marital contributions are returned; 
however, there are two (2) facts that 
suggest the need for a different division 
in this case; 
A. Cheryl is fifty-one (51) years old. 
J.W. is thirty-eight (38) years old. 
Cheryl has also suffered an injury 
to her leg that seriously limits her 
ability to work. She has a greater 
need for marital assets than does 
J.W. 
B. Most, if not all, of the 
appreciation in the value of the 
business and property is due to an 
overall increase in Moab property 
values and not to any efforts of 
either party to make the business a 
success. In fact, bars like the 
Outlaw Saloon are not a "growth 
industry" in Moab today. The bar is 
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worth more mainly because the land 
on which it sits has become more 
valuable due to economic changes in 
the area. 
FF 27 The Court finds that one-fourth (1/4) of 
the increased equity or the sum of 
THIRTEEN THOUSAND ($13,000.00) DOLLARS 
should be awarded to J.W. as his 
equitable portion of the property. The 
remainder of the increased equity is 
awarded to Cheryl. 
FF 28 J.W. concedes that there is no other 
marital asset, except the portion of 
Cheryl's IRA accumulated during the 
marriage. Cheryl contributed EIGHT 
THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED ($8,900.00) DOLLARS 
to her IRA during the marriage and those 
contributions had accumulated interest at 
an average rate of six point five (6.5%) 
percent per annum for an average of four 
(4) years. The Court finds that the value 
of the marital portion of the IRA is 
ELEVEN THOUSAND ($11,000.00) DOLLARS. 
One-half of this amount should be awarded 
to J.W. 
FF 29 J.W.fs total property award (THIRTEEN 
THOUSAND ($13,000.00) DOLLARS of the 
increased equity in the property and FIVE 
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED ($5,500.00) DOLLARS 
from the increased value of the IRA) is 
the sum of EIGHTEEN THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED 
($18,500.00) DOLLARS. Said property award 
shall bear interest at the rate of seven 
(7%) percent per annum from January 1, 
1995. The Court finds that Cheryl does 
not have the capacity to readily borrow 
said sum of money and, therefore, she 
will need to make payments on the 
property award. The Court finds that the 
sum of approximately TWO HUNDRED FIFTY 
($250.00) DOLLARS per month would allow 
a payoff of the property settlement over 
a period of approximately eight (8) 
years. Said monthly payments shall 
commence on February 1, 1995. As long as 
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the payments are current, no execution 
shall issue but J.W. shall be entitled to 
a lien on the real estate under the bar 
in the amount of the property award until 
same has been fully paid, together with 
interest thereon. 
Given the express Findings of Fact of the Trial 
Court, it was J. W.fs job to marshal all of the evidence 
and, despite the evidence, demonstrate that the Court's 
Findings were clearly erroneous. A brief survey of the 
record demonstrates a considerable amount of evidence to 
support each of the Findings. Most importantly, there is 
evidence to support the Findings of value and 
distribution. Once the Court established the value of The 
Outlaw Saloon with its adjacent properties at $155,000 
minus the obligation thereon at $43,000, the Court found 
a net value of $112,000. All of the evidence and 
documentation supported the fact that Cheryl had invested 
at least $60,000 of her separate pre-marital or inherited 
property into the business (Add. D, Ex. P-4) and that 
J.W. had never contributed a dime by way of any pre-
marital or inherited property (TT 53-54, 216-217). The 
Court found that Cheryl should recover all of her 
investment. The remaining equity was the sum of $52,000. 
The Court then reasoned that the usual presumption 
was that marital property should be divided equally after 
the pre-marital contributions were returned (FF 26). 
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Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304 (Utah 1988). In the 
case at bar, however, the Court found that there were two 
factors which suggested that a different division was 
appropriate: (1) The comparative physical conditions of 
the parties and (2) The basis for the increased 
appreciation in the asset being divided• First, the Court 
made note of the fact that Cheryl was substantially older 
than J.W. Cheryl was 51 and J.W. was 38 years old. Cheryl 
had suffered an injury to her leg which seriously limited 
her ability to work, while J.W. was in excellent health. 
The Court found that Cheryl had a greater need for 
marital assets than did J.W. (FF 26A) . Those Findings 
were supported by the evidence. Cheryl testified as to 
her age, her serious injury and inability to stand for 
long periods of time. She testified about her past work 
history and the impact of her injury on her ability to 
perform her normal work (TT 62-63) . Her prospects for 
employment outside of the bar did not appear good (TT 
205). By contrast, 38-year-old J.W. had gained employment 
at the highest rate of pay he had ever earned, namely, 
$6.00 per hour (TT 275). That was up from $4.00 per hour 
at the time he came into the marriage (TT 271) . His 
vigorous personal appearance on the witness stand 
evidenced his health and his ability to earn. All of 
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these facts were before the Court and provided a basis 
for the Court's Findings. 
Additionally, Joe Kingsley had testified about the 
appreciated value of the property from the time it was 
purchased in 1991 for $80,000 to the time of the divorce 
when it was valued at $155,000. He testified that most, 
if not all, of the increased value of the property was 
due to the overall increase in property values in Moab 
due to the economy (TT 31). He testified that bars did 
not do well but that the property itself had appreciated 
substantially due to the economy (TT 31-34). That 
evidence was uncontroverted. It also provides a basis for 
the Court's Finding of Fact 26B. 
Because of those factors, the Court found that it 
would not be equitable to divide equally the appreciation 
associated with The Outlaw Saloon. In Finding of Fact 27, 
the Court found that 25% of the marital equity was the 
sum of $13,000 and should be awarded to J.W. ($112,000 -
$60,000 returned to Cheryl = $52,000 x .25% = $13,000) 
and the remaining 75% of the marital equity should be 
awarded to Cheryl ($52,000 x .75 = $39,000). 
The Court then went on to value the only other 
marital asset, namely, the marital portion of Cheryl's 
IRA account. The uncontroverted testimony at trial 
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established that the marital portion of the IRA account 
together with interest was $11,000. The Court found that 
one-half of that amount, namely, $5,500 should be awarded 
to J.W. 
J.W. was awarded a property interest for his one-
half of the IRA and his one-fourth of the marital equity 
in the Outlaw Saloon which totaled $18,500. The evidence 
supported Cheryl's need for additional assets and the 
fact that her original investment caused most of the 
appreciated value in the business. The Court's 
distribution cannot be found to be clearly erroneous nor 
can it be found to be inequitable and, therefore, the 
findings of the Trial Court should be affirmed. 
V 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERROR IN AWARDING THE APPELLEE 
THE CAUSE OF ACTION FOR THE OPTION AGREEMENT. 
The testimony at trial established that the parties 
signed an Option Agreement with Cheryl's uncle to 
purchase an adjacent lot for the sum of $10,000 on 
October 2, 1990 (FF 12). The option had to be exercised 
within one year (FF 12). With respect to the value of the 
option, if any, the Court entered the following Findings 
of Fact: 
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FF 19 On October 2, 1991, when the opinion 
to purchase the adjacent lot was due 
to expire, Cheryl decided to 
exercise the option and contacted 
her uncle for that purpose. Her 
uncle rejected her tender and told 
her that she and J.W. would do 
better to put their money into a 
home. The record reflects no further 
effort to acquire the adjacent lot 
until October 25, 1993 when Cheryl's 
lawyer wrote a letter to Cheryl's 
uncle in an attempt to persuade him 
to go through with the sale. That 
effort failed and Cheryl decided to 
abandon the effort. A portion of the 
Saloon building actually sits on the 
adjacent lot and a significant 
portion of the parking lot is 
located on part of said parcel. 
Cheryl presently pays her uncle ONE 
HUNDRED ($100•00) DOLLARS per month 
for the right to occupy said 
property but has no written 
agreement with him. 
FF 24 Although either Cheryl or J.W. may 
initially have had a chance of 
legally compelling the uncle to 
consummate the sale of the adjacent 
lot, prospects of success have been 
dimmed by their failure to pursue 
their claim. The Court finds that 
their claim to the adjacent lot has 
little or no value. Because Cheryl 
has the best chance of being able to 
deal with her uncle for the adjacent 
lot, the Court finds that it is most 
appropriate that the business, the 
real estate, the claim to the 
adjacent lot, if any, be awarded to 
Cheryl. 
The Findings of Fact of the Trial Court should be 
affirmed unless they are clearly erroneous. J.W. is 
required to marshal all of the evidence from the 
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transcript in support of the Trial Court's Findings of 
Fact. He has ignored that responsibility. This Court 
should refuse to consider any further attack on the Trial 
Court's Finding because of that failure (Hagan, supra). 
In Arguendo/ a brief review of a portion of the 
trial testimony will indicate the justification for the 
Trial Court's Findings. First, the parties have no 
interest in the real property other than a "claim" or 
cause of action based upon an Option Agreement entered 
on October 2, 1990 (FF 19 and 24). J.W. talks about the 
property as though he was in possession of same and 
claims a value of at least $25,000. The testimony at 
trial established that J.W. had abandoned any claim for 
enforcement of the Option. He had never hired an attorney 
to even render an opinion much less enforce the Option 
Agreement (TT 219). He presented no expert witness at 
trial to establish the merit of any alleged claim. He 
never initiated a law suit to establish what, if any, 
legal claim he might have on the property (TT 219-220). 
On the date the Option contract was due and the sum of 
$10,000 had to be paid, J.W. had no money whatsoever from 
which he could have paid for the Option (TT 273). 
By contrast, Cheryl had actually attempted to 
exercise the Option on October 2, 1991 (TT 110-116). She 
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did have funds from her own separate monies with which 
to have exercised the Option (TT 110-116). If she had 
been able to exercise the Option, she would have used 
sole and separate property to do so and, therefore, J.W. 
would not have had a claim anyway. When the Cheryl's 
uncle refused the tender, Cheryl waited over two years 
to seek any legal advice (TT 110-116). In August of 1993, 
she did consult with an attorney on her behalf only (TT 
110-116). Counsel advised Cheryl of the limited 
likelihood of success and the considerable cost 
associated with trying to enforce the Option (TT 110-116; 
218-220) . Cheryl went home and discussed the matter with 
J.W. who was unwilling and unable to provide any funds 
to help enforce the contract (TT 114-116). Cheryl took 
no further steps to enforce the Option (TT 219). There 
is no other testimony in the record. There is nothing 
whatsoever to establish a legal basis to believe that the 
parties have any valid claim for enforcement of the 
Option and the Trial Court so found (FF 24). The Court 
went on to find that if there was some dim hope of 
success, it should be awarded to Cheryl (FF 24) as she 
had the best ability to deal with her uncle and also had 
a building sitting on a portion of the property. 
Additionally, she had a Rental Agreement which authorized 
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her to use the property and for which she was paying 
monthly consideration. 
Given the complete lack of evidence presented by 
J.W., it is not unreasonable to assume nor inaccurate for 
the Trial Court to find that the Option had little or no 
value. Since the Appellant failed to marshal all of the 
evidence in support of the Trial Court's Findings, and 
despite such evidence, demonstrate that the Trial Court's 
Findings were clearly erroneous, the Trial Court should 
be affirmed with respect to its award of the cause of 
action for the Option Agreement. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant has attacked the failure of the Trial 
Court to impose sanctions or order the sale of The Outlaw 
Saloon claiming that he was surprised by the Appellee's 
desires not to sell the saloon at the time of trial. 
Since Appellant failed to prepare and present any 
independent testimony on valuation of assets which was 
necessary for a determination of the issues at trial and 
since Appellee's "desires" concerning a possible sale of 
the business were irrelevant and immaterial to the issues 
before the Court and since the Appellant never requested 
a continuance, sanctions, penalties or a sale of property 
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before or during the Trial, there was no reason for the 
Trial Court to consider such a course of action. 
Appellant has attacked the Trial Court's Findings 
with respect to the valuation of The Outlaw Saloon and 
the award of the cause of action for the Option 
Agreement. In each instance, the Court entered specific 
Findings of Fact. Appellant did not marshal all of the 
evidence that would have supported the Court's Findings 
of Fact but, instead, ignored the supporting evidence and 
pointed to his own disputed evidence. Rule 52(a) Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, requires the Appellant to 
marshal all of the evidence and then demonstrate, despite 
such evidence, that the findings of the Court are clearly 
erroneous. The Appellant has failed in that burden of 
proof and, therefore, the Trial Court's decision and the 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree of 
Divorce entered thereon should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this 6th day of November, 
J<$pK PAPPAS WHITE 
Attorney for Appellee 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed two (2) 
true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF 
APPELLEE, by posting in the United States mail, postage 
prepaid, on this 6th day of November, 1995 to the 
following: 
JAMES C. LEWIS 
George S. Diumenti, II 
DIUMENTI & LEWIS 
505 South Main Street 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
DME PAP PAS WHITE: 
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ADDENDUM A 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Decree of Divorce 
"
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'GIMAL 
SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT 
JOANE PAPPAS WHITE #3445 Grand County 
A t t o r n e y D e f e n d a n t 
F i f t h S t r e e t P l a z a , S u i t e 1 FILED FFR 1 7 ',4135 
4 7 5 E a s t Main S t r e e t 
P r i c e , U t a h 8 4 5 0 1 
T e l e p h o n e : (801 ) 6 3 7 - 0 1 7 7 
CLERK Or THE COURT 
BY. 
IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CHERYL MONDERS, 
Plaintiff, 
Vs. 
KENNETH WAYNE MONDERS, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 9447-8 
The above-en titled matter came on regularly for trial 
before the Court on the 3rd day of January, 1995, the Honorable 
LYLE R. ANDERSON, District Court Judge, presiding. Plaintiff was 
personally present and accompanied by her attorney JOANE PAPPAS 
WHITE. Defendant was personally present and accompanied by his 
attorney JAMES C. LEWIS. The Court received sworn testimony and 
exhibits and took the matter under advisement. Having been fully 
advised in the premises, the Court issued a Memorandum Decision and 
now, finds as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Plaintiff was an actual and bona fide residen 
of Grand County, State of Utah, and had been for more than thre< 
(3) months immediately next prior to the commencement of this 
action, 
2. The parties hereto were married on the 25th day of 
April, 1987 at Las Vegas, Clark County, State of Nevada and have 
been husband and wife since that date. 
3. The parties hereto separated on or about November, 
1993 and have lived separate and apart since that time. 
4. The Court finds that irreconcilable differences have 
developed between the parties which makes it impossible for them to 
maintain a marital relationship and, therefore, the Plaintiff 
should be granted a Decree of Divorce terminating her marriage to 
the Defendant on the grounds of irreconcilable differences. 
5. There have been no children born as the issue of 
this marriage and^  none are expected. 
6. At the time of their marriage, the Plaintiff 
(hereinafter called "Cheryl") was employed at a motel and 
restaurant in Moab, Utah and she also owned and operated a bar in 
Moab known as the Outlaw Saloon. The assets of the bar had been 
purchased with Cheryl's money. She operated the bar in a rented 
building. 
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7. At the time of the marriage, Cheryl had invested 
about TWENTY THOUSAND ($20,000.00) DOLLARS of her money in 
establishing the original Outlaw Saloon. She also had NINE THOUSAND 
NINETY ($9,090.00) DOLLARS in currency in a safety deposit box, the 
sum of FIFTEEN THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED TWENTY-FOUR ($15,524.00) 
DOLLARS in a savings account at Williamsburg Bank, the sum of NINE 
THOUSAND ($9,000.00) DOLLARS in an individual retirement account, 
the sum of SIX HUNDRED EIGHTY-FIVE DOLLARS THIRTY CENTS ($685.30) 
in her checking account, an ounce of gold, motel stock worth ELEVEN 
THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE ($11,445.00) DOLLARS and a TEN 
THOUSAND ($10,000.00) DOLLAR tax exempt bearer bond. 
8. The Defendant (hereinafter called "J.W.") brought no 
assets into the marriage except a 1975 Thunderbird automobile and 
his clothing. 
9. At the time of the marriage, Cheryl's employer was 
providing meals, lodging and health insurance for her as a benefit 
of her employment. After the marriage, those benefits continued and 
were also extended to J.W. as a benefit of Cheryl's employment. 
10. A few months before the marriage, J.W. terminated 
his minimum wage employment as a custodian for another motel and 
began working in the bar. From that point forward, J.W. worked 
regularly in the bar, except for three (3) months when he attempted 
to start a business for himself. He continued to work in the bar 
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until the parties separated in November of 1993. Cheryl managed and 
also worked in the bar during the same period of time. 
11. In late 1990, Cheryl became aware that the motel and 
restaurant where she worked were scheduled to be torn down. 
Construction of a new motel would require the use of the space 
where she had been operating the bar. She, therefore, began looking 
for another location. 
12. On October 2, 1990, Cheryl contracted to purchase a 
lot building from her uncle for TWENTY-THREE THOUSAND ($23,000.00) 
DOLLARS down and the balance of FIFTY-SEVEN THOUSAND ($57,000.00) 
DOLLARS to be financed at the rate of ten (10%) percent per annum 
over ten (10) years. J.W. was a party to the contract but furnished 
none of the down payment. The down payment came from the pre-
marital and inherited property of Cheryl. (Cheryl inherited SIXTEEN 
THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED ($16,600.00) DOLLARS in cash from her father's 
estate in 1988 and THREE THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED SIXTEEN ($3,316.00) 
DOLLARS in cash plus a right to ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY-THREE ($183.00) 
DOLLARS per month for seven (7) years from her mother's estate in 
1991.) On the same day, the uncle granted Cheryl and J.W. an option 
to purchase the adjacent lot for TEN THOUSAND ($10,000.00) DOLLARS. 
Said option was to be exercised within one (1) year. 
13. Cheryl then began to remodel and improve the 
existing building to create a place to operate her bar. All of the 
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remodeling funds came from Cheryl's pre-marital or inherited 
property. 
14. Cheryl had incorporated the Outlaw Saloon in 1988. 
She was its sole shareholder and, in exchange for the shares, she 
had conveyed all of the property and assets of the original Outlaw 
Saloon into said corporation. Throughout the marriage, she has 
remained the sole owner of all of the shares of said corporation. 
15. Cheryl loaned the remodeling funds to the 
corporation from her sole and separate property. Cheryl claims to 
have loaned a total of FIFTY-SEVEN THOUSAND ($57,000.00) DOLLARS to 
the corporation for the remodeling. However, the 1991 corporate tax 
returns list stockholder loans to the corporation of only TWENTY-
FIVE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED ($25,500.00) DOLLARS as of the end of 
1991. Cheryl has presented no other documentation of that 
investment. Cheryl has shown that she sold her motel stock in 1991, 
presumably to finance the remodeling effort. At the time of its 
sale, the motel stock was worth FIFTEEN THOUSAND ($15,000.00) 
DOLLARS. 
16. J.W. and Cheryl filed joint tax returns for 1987 
through 1992 and Cheryl filed corporate tax returns from 1989 
through 1992. Every tax return showed Cheryl as the sole proprietor 
of the bar before its incorporation and the sole owner of the 
corporation after its creation. Cheryl is the only shareholder in 
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the corporation although J.W. served as a director and a nomin; 
secretary. 
17. The Outlaw Saloon ceased operation at its origins 
location in August of 1991 and the new bar opened in October c 
1991. 
18. The new bar included living quarters for Cheryl an 
J.W. During the course of the marriage, J.W.'s meals, lodging 
insurance and transportation needs were provided as a condition o 
Cheryl's employment or in conjunction with the operation of th 
business. J.W. received no separate compensation until 1989 for hi. 
work in the business. 
19. On October 2, 1991, when the option to purchase th* 
adjacent lot was due to expire, Cheryl decided to exercise the 
option and contacted her uncle for that purpose. Her uncle rejectee 
her tender and told her that she and J.W. would do better to put 
their money into a home. The record reflects no further effort to 
acquire the adjacent lot until October 25, 1993 when Cheryl's 
lawyer wrote a letter to Cheryl's uncle in an attempt to persuade 
him "to go through with the sale. That effort failed and Cheryl 
decided to abandon the effort. A portion of the Saloon building 
actually sits on the adjacent lot and a significant portion of the 
parking lot is located on part of said parcel. Cheryl presently 
pays her uncle ONE HUNDRED ($100.00) DOLLARS per month for the 
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right to occupy said property but has no written agreement with 
him. 
20. After their separation in November, 1993, the 
parties entered into a struggle for control of the bar and the 
living quarters therein. At the time of trial, Cheryl had prevailed 
and was living in and managing the bar without any help from J.W. 
21. On March 2, 1992, Cheryl and J.W. signed an 
agreement. That agreement estimated Cheryl's investment in the 
business at SIXTY THOUSAND ($60,000.00) DOLLARS and provided that 
J.W. would reimburse her for one-half of that amount or the sum of 
THIRTY THOUSAND ($30,000.00) DOLLARS. The agreement also divided 
responsibility for the operation of the bar, set salaries for 
Cheryl and J.W., and outlined a means for preserving the marital 
union. J.W. did not make more than the first few payments under 
this agreement and did not sell his trailer and pay over the 
proceeds as he had agreed. He explained this breach as a natural 
consequence of the failure of the corporation to pay all of the 
salary provided by the agreement. 
22. The 1992 agreement is not useful as a legal document 
because it was breached by both parties. Agreements between the 
parties to a marriage are not usually binding on a divorce court. 
(Antenuptial and postnuptial agreements can be enforceable in Utah 
but only under conditions that this agreement made no effort to 
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meet.) The agreement is most helpful as an expression of the states 
of mind of Cheryl and J.W. at a time when the pre-divorce legal 
posturing had not yet begun. The agreement reflects a recognition 
by both parties that the bar has been a joint marital venture but 
that Cheryl alone had made a substantial financial investment in 
that venture. Based on this agreement and the circumstances 
outlined above, the Court finds that the bar is a marital asset but 
that equitable division will require that Cheryl receive more than 
one-half of this marital asset. 
23. Cheryl's evidence about the value of the Outlaw 
Saloon was not countered by evidence from J.W. Cheryl's expert 
opined that the total value of the property is ONE HUNDRED FIFTY-
FIVE THOUSAND ($155,000.00) DOLLARS. The Court accepts this value. 
Cheryl and J.W. still owe her uncle FORTY-THREE THOUSAND 
($43,000.00) DOLLARS for the property. 
24. Although either Cheryl or J.W. may initially have 
had a chance of legally compelling the uncle to consummate the sale 
of the adjacent lot, prospects of success have been dimmed by their 
failure to pursue their claim. The Court finds that their claim to 
the adjacent lot has little or no value. Because Cheryl has the 
best chance of being able to deal with her uncle for the adjacent 
lot, the Court finds that it is most appropriate that the business, 
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the real estate, the claim to the adjacent lot, if any, be awarded 
to Cheryl. 
25. The Court finds that the net value of all of these 
assets is the sum of ONE HUNDRED TWELVE THOUSAND ($112,000.00) 
DOLLARS. Cheryl had invested SIXTY THOUSAND ($60,000.00) DOLLARS of 
her separate pre-marital or inherited property in the business as 
of March 1993. The Court finds that she is entitled to recover all 
of that investment. The Court must then determine an equitable 
distribution for the remaining value of the property. 
26. The usual presumption is that marital property 
should be divided equally after pre-marital contributions are 
returned; however, there are two (2) facts that suggest the need 
for a different division in this case: 
A. Cheryl is fifty-one (51) years old. J.W. is 
thirty-eight (38) years old. Cheryl has also suffered an injury to 
her leg that seriously limits her ability to work. She has a 
greater need for marital assets than does J.W. 
B. Most, if not all, of the appreciation in the 
value of the business and property is due to an overall increase in 
Moab property values and not to any efforts of either party to make 
the business a success. In fact, bars like the Outlaw Saloon are 
not a "growth industry" in Moab today. The bar is worth more mainly 
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because the land on which it sits has become more valuable due t 
economic changes in the area. 
27. The Court finds that one-fourth (1/4) of th 
increased equity or the sum of THIRTEEN THOUSAND ($13,000.00 
DOLLARS should be awarded to J.W. as his equitable portion of th< 
property. The remainder of the increased equity is awarded t< 
Cheryl. 
28. J.W. concedes that there is no other marital asset, 
except the portion of Cheryl's IRA accumulated during the marriage. 
Cheryl contributed EIGHT THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED ($8,900.00) DOLLARS 
to her IRA during the marriage and those contributions had 
accumulated interest at an average rate of six point five (6.5%) 
percent per annum for an average of four (4) years. The Court finds 
that the value of the marital portion of the IRA is ELEVEN THOUSAND 
($11,000.00) DOLLARS. One-half of this amount should be awarded to 
J.W. 
29. J.W.'s total property award (THIRTEEN THOUSAND 
($13,000.00) DOLLARS of the increased equity in the property and 
FIVE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED ($5,500.00) DOLLARS from the increased 
value of the IRA) is the sum of EIGHTEEN THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED 
($18,500.00) DOLLARS. Said property award shall bear interest at 
the rate of seven (7%) percent per annum from January 1, 1995. The 
Court finds that Cheryl does not have the capacity to readily 
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borrow said sum of money and, therefore, she will need to make 
payments on the property award. The Court finds that the sum of 
approximately TWO HUNDRED FIFTY ($250.00) DOLLARS per month would 
allow a payoff of the property settlement over a period of 
approximately eight (8) years. Said monthly payments shall commence 
on February 1, 1995. As long as the payments are current, no 
execution shall issue but J.W. shall be entitled to a lien on the 
real estate under the bar in the amount of the property award until 
same has been fully paid, together with interest thereon. 
30. Neither party has requested alimony during the 
proceeding and the Court awards no alimony herein. 
31. Each party is ordered to bear his or her own Court 
costs and attorney's fees in this matter. 
32. The Plaintiff has sustained the allegations of her 
Complaint by adequate evidence. 
The Court having entered the foregoing Findings of Fact 
now concludes as follows: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Plaintiff is granted a divorce from the 
Defendant. 
2. The parties hereto have accumulated certain real and 
personal property during this marriage and said property is awarded 
as follows: 
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A. The Plaintiff is awarded the Outlaw Saloon bar 
together with all of its assets, and the building and property 
where same is located, free and clear of all claims of the 
Defendant with the exception that the Defendant shall be entitled 
to a lien against the real property until the property settlement 
awarded to the Defendant has been fully paid. Said property is 
located in Moab, Grand County, State of Utah and is more 
particularly described as follows: 
BEG 6 RD N & 150 FT W OF NE CORNER BLK 25 MSS, W 67.5 FT, 
N 243 FT, E 67 4 FT, S 243 FT TO BEG. ALT # 26-21-1-93. 
ACRES; 0.38 
The Plaintiff is ordered to assume and pay the 
outstanding indebtedness to her uncle, Clair Tangren, for the 
underlying obligation on said property and hold the Defendant 
harmless therefrom. 
B. The Plaintiff is awarded any claim or chose-in-
action which the parties may have, free and clear of all claims of 
the Defendant, against the Plaintiff's uncle Clair Tangren with 
respect to the adjacent lot located in Moab, Grand County, State of 
Utah and more particularly described as follows: 
BEG 99 feet North and 193 feet East of the Northwest 
Corner Block 25 MSS, thence North 243 feet; thence East 
50 feet; thence South 243 feet; thence West 50 feet to 
the place of beginning. Together with all improvements 
thereon and appurtenances thereunto belonging. 
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C. The Defendant is awarded a property settlement 
in the total sum of EIGHTEEN THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED ($18,500.00) 
DOLLARS, bearing interest at the rate of seven (7%) percent per 
annum from January 1, 1995 until fully paid. Said property 
settlement shall be paid by the Plaintiff to the Defendant at the 
rate of TWO HUNDRED FIFTY-TWO DOLLARS TWENTY-THREE CENTS ($252.23) 
per month commencing February 1, 1995 and continuing each and every 
month thereafter for a period of eight (8) years or until said 
property settlement together with accumulated interest thereon has 
been fully paid. Said property settlement shall be a lien on the 
real property located under the Outlaw Saloon bar until the 
property award has been fully paid. The Plaintiff is ordered to pay 
said property settlement to the Defendant under the terms and 
conditions outlined herein. As long as said payments are current, 
no execution on the property settlement shall issue but the 
Defendant shall receive a lien on said real property as provided 
for herein. 
D. The Plaintiff is awarded all of her IRA account 
free and clear of all claims of the Defendant. 
E. Each party is awarded his or her pre-marital 
property free and clear of all claims of the other. 
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F. Each party is awarded those items of marital 
personal property in his or her possession as of the date of trial 
on January 3, 1995. 
3. Neither party is awarded any alimony. 
4. Each party is ordered to pay his or her own Court 
costs and attorney's fees in this matter. 
DATED this day of 
iZh ' 1995-
LYl£-"R. ANDERSON 
District Court Judge 
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IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CHERYL MONDERS, ] 
Plaintiff, 
Vs. ] 
KENNETH WAYNE MONDERS, ] 
Defendant. 
i DECREE OF DIVORCE 
> Civil No. 9447-8 
The above-en titled matter came on regularly for trial 
before the Court on the 3rd day of January, 1995, the Honorable 
LYLE R. ANDERSON, District Court Judge, presiding. Plaintiff was 
personally present and accompanied by her attorney JOANE PAPPAS 
WHITE. Defendant was personally present and accompanied by his 
attorney JAMES C. LEWIS. The Court received sworn testimony and 
exhibits and took the matter under advisement. Having been fully 
advised in the premises, the Court issued a Memorandum Decision and 
having entered the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law now, therefore; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. The Plaintiff is granted a divorce from the 
Defendant. 
2. The parties hereto have accumulated certain real ai 
personal property during this marriage and said property is awards 
as follows: 
A. The Plaintiff is awarded the Outlaw Saloon bs 
together with all of its assets, and the building and propert 
where same is located, free and clear of all claims of th 
Defendant with the exception that the Defendant shall be entitle 
to a lien against the real property until the property settlemen 
awarded to the Defendant has been fully paid. Said property it 
located in Moab, Grand County, State of Utah and is more 
particularly described as follows: 
BEG 6 RD N & 150 FT W OF NE CORNER BLK 25 MSS, W 67.5 FT, 
N 243 FT, E 67 4 FT, S 243 FT TO BEG. ALT # 26-21-1-93. 
ACRES; 0.38 
Together with all improvements thereon and appurtenances 
thereunto belonging. 
The Plaintiff is ordered to assume and pay the 
outstanding indebtedness to her uncle, Clair Tangren, for the 
underlying obligation on said property and hold the Defendant 
harmless therefrom. 
B. The Plaintiff is awarded any claim or chose-in-
action which the parties may have, free and clear of all claims of 
the Defendant, against the Plaintiffs uncle Clair Tangren with 
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respect to the adjacent lot located in Moab, Grand County, State of 
Utah and more particularly described as follows: 
BEG 99 feet North and 193 feet East of the Northwest 
Corner Block 25 MSS, thence North 243 feet; thence East 
50 feet; thence South 243 feet; thence West 50 feet to 
the place of beginning. Together with all improvements 
thereon and appurtenances thereunto belonging. 
C. The Defendant is awarded a property settlement 
in the total sum of EIGHTEEN THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED ($18,500.00) 
DOLLARS, bearing interest at the rate of seven (7%) percent per 
annum from January 1, 1995 until fully paid. Said property 
settlement shall be paid by the Plaintiff to the Defendant at the 
rate of TWO HUNDRED FIFTY-TWO DOLLARS TWENTY-THREE CENTS ($252.23) 
per month commencing February 1, 1995 and continuing each and every 
month thereafter for a period of eight (8) years or until said 
property settlement together with accumulated interest thereon has 
been fully paid. Said property settlement shall be a lien on the 
real property located under the Outlaw Saloon bar until the 
property award has been fully paid. The Plaintiff is ordered to pay 
said property settlement to the Defendant under the terms and 
conditions outlined herein. As long as said payments are current, 
no execution on the property settlement shall issue but the 
Defendant shall receive a lien on said real property as provided 
for herein. 
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D. The Plaintiff is awarded all of her IRA account 
free and clear of all claims of the Defendant, 
E. Each party is awarded his or her pre-marital 
property free and clear of all claims of the other. 
F. Each party is awarded those items of marital 
personal property in his or her possession as of the date of trial 
on January 3, 1995, 
3. Neither party is awarded any alimony. 
4, Each party is ordered to pay his or her own Court 
costs and attorney's fees in this matter. 
DATED this W- day of J-tvtT^g ^c , 1995. 
IXtg/K. ANDERSON 
District Court Judge 
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ADDENDUM B 
Plaintiff's Answers to Defendant's 
Second Set of Interrogatories, Document Requests 
JOANE PAPPAS WHITE #3445 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Fifth Street Plaza, Suite 1 
475 East Main 
Price, Utah 84501 
Telephone: (801) 637-0177 
IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CHERYL HONDERS, 
Plaintiff, ] 
Vs. ] 
KENNETH WAYNE NONDERS, ] 
Defendant. 
) PLAINTIFF'S ANSWERS TO 
1 DEFENDANT'S SECOND SET OF | INTERROGATORIES, DOCUMENT | REQUESTS 
Civil NO. 9447-8 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff, being first duly sworn upon 
oath# and hereby responds to Defendant's Interrogatories and 
Request for Production of Docu&t^t&, pursuant to Rules 33 and 
34 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, as follows: 
INTERROGATORY NO. 1 Describe in detail 
all compensation you have received from the business known as 
The Outlaw Saloon during the calendar year 1994• (In 
responding to this interrogatory, Plaintiff should include all 
direct and indirect compensation, including personal payments 
made on Plaintiff's behalf by the business). 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 1: With the exception 
of February 1994, I was injured and not able to be here. 
Housing is provided by the Outlaw Saloon inc., for a night 
watchman, I elected to be here so as to not hire outside 
help. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 2 Indicate all of the 
periods during the calendar year 1994 during which you were 
unable to work due to the injury to your knee cap. Also 
indicate all of the periods in 1994 during which you have 
worked as a manager or a bartender of the Outlaw Saloon. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 2: I was and still am 
the owner and manager of the Outlaw Saloon Inc., since its 
inception in 1986 to date* I was off work and still am as a 
bartender from January 12, 1994 and to date have not been 
released. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 3 Please indicate 
whether or not your doctors have released you to work, and, 
if so, indicate the date of such release, and whether you are 
willing to produce a copy of said release. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 3: I have not been 
released back to work. As of October 4, 1994 my case was 
closed by Dr. Patterson. I am not signing any release until 
I try bartending which will be the end of November 1994. 
INTERROGATORY NO, 4 Describe all workers 
compensation benefits you have received as a result of your 
injury during the 1994 calendar year, and, in that regard, 
indicate the following: 
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(a) the monthly payments received by you; the date 
such payments commenced; and the date such payments 
terminated, if applicable; 
(b) the name of the workers compensation fund 
paying such benefits. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO- 4: 
(a) $167.00 per week; January 13, 1994 through 
March 24, 1994. See attached Compensation Agreement. 
(b) Worker's Compensation Fund of Utah. 
INTERROGATORY NO, 5 Indicate whether or 
not any of the assets contained in your safety deposit box at 
First Security Bank of Utah, Moab, Utah, 84532, #470, as 
identified in Plaintiff's answer to Interrogatory Number 14 
of Defendant's First Set of Interrogatories, were acquired 
during the course of the marriage. If so, identify what 
assets were acquired during the marriage. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO, 5: A title to the 
Outlaw Saloon Inc., Ford 1984 Ford Escort, bought with a part 
of my inheritance money 1988, two (2) birth certificates for 
my children (acquired by a former marriage), one (1) Kougann, 
acquired in 1982 and miscellaneous photos. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 6 Identify with 
specificity the "miscellaneous items" identified in 
subparagraph (a) in Plaintiff's answer to Interrogatory Number 
14 of Defendant's First Set of Interrogatories. 
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ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 6J A title to the 
Outlaw Saloon Inc., Ford 1984 Pord Escort, bought with a part 
of my inheritance money 1988, two (2) birth certificates for 
my children (acquired by a former marriage), one (1) Kougann, 
acquired in 1982 and miscellaneous photos-
INTERROGATORV NO. 7 Indicate all of the 
dates you have lived in the apartment unit located on the real 
property on which the Outlaw Saloon is located, since the 
separation of the parties. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 7: I did live in the 
caretakers apartment alone starting November 9, 1993 until 
January 14, 1994. I was then thrown out of my bar and house 
on a fraudulent ex-parte order and did not get back into the 
apartment until March 15, 1994. I have been there ever since. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 8 Indicate whether you 
have personally paid for each and every personal expense 
identified in response to Interrogatory Number 16 of 
Defendant's First Set of Interrogatories, or whether some or 
any of those expenses have been paid by the Outlaw Saloon. 
If the Outlaw Saloon has paid some of such expenses, please 
identify which expenses it has paid. 
ANSWER TO* INTERROGATORY NO. 8: R e n t w a s 
furnished by the Outlaw Saloon Inc., in the caretaker's 
apartment, but if I chose not to stay another party would have 
been paid* Lights, water and laundry facilities are included 
in the apartment for the service of caretaking. All other 
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expenses are paid for personally. The Plaintiff is still 
paying for the Defendant's medical insurance. 
INTERROGATORY NO, 9 Indicate the original 
purchase price of the shares of Canyonlands Cafe and Motel 
identified by Plaintiff in response to Interrogatory Number 
25 of Defendant's First Set of Interrogatories. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO* 9 In June of 1986, 
ten (io) months prior to my marriage, I purchased shares in 
the Canyonlands Motel and Cafe Inc. This stock was owned by 
me prior to my marriage and was sold for FIFTEEN THOUSAND 
($15,000.00) DOLLARS and was deposited into the Outlaw Saloon 
Inc., checking account for the purpose of building the present 
Outlaw Saloon Inc., #2. The original purchase price was TEN 
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE ($10,545,00) DOLLARS which 
has already been answered in the first set of Interrogatories • 
INTERROGATORY NO. 10 Indicate the source 
of funds for the purchase of the shares of canyonlands cafe 
and Motel. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO* 10 The stock was 
purchased prior to my marriage. Plaintiff objects to 
providing information on the source of the funds as the shares 
were premarital. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 11 Please describe what 
you mean by your response of "recalled 1988-approx," in 
response to Interrogatory Number 25 of Defendants's First Set 
of Interrogatories. 
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ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO* XI This was a tax 
free Missouri Authority Bond bought in 1982- Five (5) years 
prior to my marriage. It was recalled in 1988 and the TEN 
THOUSAND ($10#000) DOLLARS received was then placed in my 
checking account, 
INTERROGATORY NO, 12 please indicate 
whether you are willing to provide a copy of the financial 
statement or statements referred to in response to 
Interrogatory Number 28 of Defendant's First Set of 
Interrogatories, located at Nate Knight Accounting, or whether 
Defendant will be required to incur the cost and inconvenience 
of subpoenaing such records. Please indicate the same with 
respect to the financial statement or statements located at 
the office of Clara Wilburg* 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 12 Y e s , s e e 
attached. 
INTERROGATORY NO, 13 Please describe in 
detail the "many heirlooms11 you claim Defendant possesses in 
response to Interrogatory Number 30 of Defendant's Fires Set 
of Interrogatories 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 13 A patchwork quilt 
from my mother around 1962. It was hand made and my 
grandmother helped make it. Bath are now deceased. Value 
priceless, ($10,000.00); Rocker high back spindle (era 1898) 
irreplaceable, value unknown priceless. ($700,00) given to 
me by my mother twenty (26) years ago in 1967; High back 
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straight chair, value unknown ($500,00) , acquired in 1980 gift 
from my mother; and one (1) pair of diamond earrings, a 
birthday gift to me from my mother in 1985, small gold rose 
bud with a diamond center, valued at ($550.00). 
INTERROGATORY NO. 14 Please provide the 
specific information requested in subparagraphs (a-e) to 
Interrogatory Number 36 of Defendant's First Set of 
Interrogatories, which information was omitted in Plaintiff's 
first response to said Interrogatory. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY No. 14 Please see Financial 
Summary attached hereto. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 1$ Please indicate to 
whom you reported that assets were stolen, as indicated in 
subparagraph 12 of plaintiff's response to Interrogatories 
Numbers 36 and 37 of Defendant's First Set of Interrogatories• 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO* 15 Moab City Police 
Department, Steve Ross, February 26, 1994. 
INTERROGATORY NO, 16 Indicate whether or 
not there were any other individuals, in addition to the 
individuals identified in plaintiff's answer to Interrogatory 
Number 38 of Defendant's First Set of Interrogatories, who may 
testify at the trial of this action, and indicate the matters 
upon which it is anticipated such individual(s) may testify. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 16 Plaintiff Cheryl 
Monders will testify on all issues raised by her Complaint; 
Sharon Sellers, employee of the Outlaw Saloon, Inc., who will 
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testify concerning the operation of the Saloon and J*w. 
violence towards Cheryl? Debra Edwards, employee of the Outlaw 
Saloon, inc., who will testify concerning the operation of the 
Saloon and J.W. violence towards Cheryl; Joe Kingsley who will 
testify with respect to the market value of the Outlaw Saloon; 
Mary Lou Shupe, Abuse; Dennis Nielson, abuse; Dennis Wilberg, 
Abuse; Mike Gillispie, abuse; Dan Black, Outlaw Saloon Inc, 
#1 and #2; Don Covey, Canyonlands Motel and Outlaw Saloon; 
Jeane Couchman, Canyonlands Motel and Outlaw Saloon; Maria 
Fergurson, Outlaw Saloon, Inc. #1 and #2; Willie Tucker, 
Canyonlands Motel, Outlaw saloon #1 and abuse. 
JOANE REVIEW 
INTERROGATORY NO, 17 Indicate whether you 
are willing to obtain a copy of your payroll records which 
show your earnings from January 1, 1994 to the present from 
Smuin, Rich and Marsing, as identified in answer to 
Defendant's request number 1 of Defendant's First Request for 
Production of Documents. Alternatively, indicate whether you 
are willing to sign a release or consent, authorizing the 
release of such records to Defendant. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO* 17 See attached 
Employer's Quarterly Wage List. Yes, I am willing to sign a 
consent to release such records. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 18 Indicate whether 
your personal tax returns and tax returns for the business for 
the Outlaw Saloon, for the calendar year 1993, have been 
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completed. If so, indicate whether you will provide a copy 
of said tax returns. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 18 Yes, they were 
completed and sent in. Yes I will provide a copy. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 19 Describe in detail 
all efforts undertaken by you, or anyone on your behalf, to 
sell, or offer for sale, the business known as the Outlaw 
Saloon, and the real property on which the Outlaw Saloon is 
located. In responding to this Interrogatory, please identify 
all individuals with whom contact has been made regarding a 
prospective sale to the business, including the names and 
addresses of prospective buyers, the names and addresses of 
real estate brokers or agents involved in such prospective 
sale, and any other individuals who may have been involved in 
any such prospective transaction* 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 19 I have told a 
thousand people that this business will be for sale upon the 
completion of this divorce. The names, addresses and 
telephone numbers is too lengthy to list at this time. These 
efforts to sell to these various people are in an unofficial 
nature pending the finality of this action. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 20 Please identify any 
appraisals, property evaluations or reevaluations conducted 
on the real property and the business known as the Outlaw 
Saloon. In responding to such interrogatory, indicate the 
name, address and telephone number of any person or firm who 
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was involved in such appraisal, evaluation or reevaluation, 
and indicate what information was provided to any such party 
by you or anyone on your behalf to enable such party to 
complete their appraisal, evaluation or reevaluation. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 20 B o b M u i r 
estimated value based on structure, size, type, age and the 
quality of the construction. The value was between ONE 
HUNDRED FIFTY to ONE HUNDRED SIXTY THOUSAND DOLLARS 
($150,000.00 to $160/000.00) - Closed door business. The 
business was worth six (6%) percent of one (1) years profit. 
He is now deceased. Grand County Assessors Office. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 21 Indicate the source 
of the deposit of $37,912.35 into your Golden Passbook Savings 
Account, #18378423, on September 19, 1990. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 21 See Financial 
Summary attached hereto. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 22 Indicate where the 
funds from the withdrawal on October 2, 1990 in the amount of 
$23,000,00, from the account referred to in the above 
paragraph, were transferred. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 22 They were 
transferred to M. C. Tangren for a down payment on the 
property, quonset hut, building and lot- See attached 
document for production #9. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 23 Indicate whether you 
are willing to sell the business known as the outlaw Saloon, 
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together with the real property on which it is located, and 
all of your rights to purchase the adjacent lot #95, pursuant 
to an option agreement with your uncle. If the answer to this 
Interrogatory is "yes," indicate the price at which you would 
be willing to sell these properties and assets. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 23 Yes, I am willing 
to sell the business known as the Outlaw Saloon Inc., of which 
I am 100% stockholder and president together with the real 
property on which it is located of which I am a joint tenant 
with the Defendant whom has not contributed any monies for the 
purpose of said lot* No I cannot sell something I do not have 
on the adjacent lot #95. I do not have an option. 
INTERROGATORY NO, 24 Indicate whether you 
would be willing to split with defendant the cost of an 
appraisal for the business and real property on which the 
Outlaw Saloon is located, if such appraisal can be completed 
prior to the trial date. In responding to this Interrogatory, 
indicate all conditions you and your counsel would require to 
such an arrangement. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 24 NO. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 25 Indicate if you are 
willing to have a real estate expert engaged by Defendant, 
inspect the premises, and receives all of the pertinent books 
and records of the Outlaw Saloon. If so, indicate what, if 
any, books and records of the business you are not willing to 
allow such person to review. 
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ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 25 No, 
INTERROGATORY NO, 26 Please describe in 
detail all monies you claim are owed to you by the Outlaw 
Saloon, or Defendant. In responding to such interrogatory# 
describe the date(s) such monies were advanced by you to the 
Outlaw Saloon or Defendant, the source of such monies, and any 
documentation, instrumentsf or papers evidencing such 
obligation or transfer of monies* 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 26 EIGHTY-NINE 
THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED NINETY-THREE ($89,193.00) DOLLARS plus 
interest. Amount of money documented. No return on this 
money has been made. This money was put up by the Plaintiff 
as the financier of the Outlaw Saloon #1 and #2* These monies 
would have earned the Plaintiff THIRTY-FIVE THOUSAND 
($35,000.00) DOLLARS in the period of time had this money been 
placed in other endeavors. See financial Summary attached 
hereto. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 27 For each of the 
Requests for Admission set forth in this set of discovery 
which you deny, set forth in detail the factual basis for such 
denial, and identify any documents or witnesses who provide 
support for such denial. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 27 These will be 
supplemented. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 28 Describe in detail 
all outstanding indebtedness or obligations of the Outlaw 
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Saloon, including date the indebtedness or obligation was 
incurred, name and address of the creditor, amount of 
indebtedness outstanding, and payment terms. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 28 Cheryl Monders, 
indebtedness, ONE HUNDRED TWENTY-FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED 
NINETY-THREE ($124,193,00) DOLLARS. M.C. Tangren, FORTY 
THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED EIGHTY-THREE DOLLARS AND SIXTY-NINE 
($40,483-69) CENTS, monthly payment SEVEN HUNDRED FIFTY-SIX 
DOLLARS AND TWENTY-SIX ($456«26) CENTS, payment on terms on 
Cheryl ten (10%) percent interest increasing compounded. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 29 Identify any 
individual or firm which you have engaged, or which you 
anticipate engaging, to testify at trial regarding the value 
of the business known as the Outlaw Saloon, the real property 
on which it is located, and/or lot 95. In responding to this 
Interrogatory, describe in detail the matters on which it is 
anticipated such individual(s) or firm(s) will testify, and 
describe in detail all documents, papers, materials, and other 
information that has been provided or which it is anticipated 
will be provided, to such individual(s) or firm(s), to enable 
such party or parties to perform such work. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 29 Joe Kingsley 
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 1 Please provide 
copies of the bank statements for the Outlaw Saloon, covering 
the period beginning from the date of inception of the 
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business through September 30, 1994, (These documents were 
previously requested in Defendant's First Set of Discovery, 
but bank statements covering only Plaintiff's personal 
accounts were produced in response to this request* 
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 1 B a n k 
statements from 1986, 1988 - 1989 are missing* 1991 to 
present are sketchy. See attached. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO, 2 Please provide 
a copy of the cash register receipts from the Outlaw Saloon, 
for each day from January 1, through September 30, 1994. 
Alternatively, Plaintiff can make these receipts available for 
inspection at a mutually convenient time, and indicate when 
such documents may be available. 
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 2 C a S h 
register receipts can be made available to Defendant's counsel 
at the Outlaw Saloon. Please advise which day would be 
convenient through Plaintiff's counsel. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 3 Please provide 
a copy of any contracts, correspondence or documents 
pertaining to any remodeling, improvements, refurbishing or 
other construction performed on the real property and business 
known as the Outlaw Saloon. 
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 3 Omstruction 
has not started. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO, 4 Please provide 
any documentation, papers and writings which support your 
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claim that you contributed pre-marital monies or assets to the 
business known as the Outlaw Saloon and the real property on 
which it sits. 
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 4 See attached 
Financial Summary. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO, 5 Please provide 
monthly personal bank statements for any and all checking or 
other accounts which would show your personal expenditures 
during the calendar year 1994. 
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 5 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 6 Please provide 
copies of any contracts, correspondence, and other documents 
pertaining to the option agreement with Marvin Tangren, and 
the real property owned by Marvin C. Tangren, located adjacent 
to the property on which the Outlaw Saloon is located, 
commonly known as Lot 95. Such response should include any 
correspondence between your counsel and Mr- Tangren, and from 
Mr. Tangren to you or your counsel. 
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 6 These items 
were stolen. I reported them to Moab city Police on February 
26, 1994. See police report on production no. 12. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 7 Please provide 
copies of all corporate documents of the Outlaw Saloon, Inc., 
including articles of incorporation and bylaws, as amended; 
minutes of meetings of, or action taken by, the board of 
15 
directors, officers, and shareholders, and contracts between 
the corporation and any third parties. 
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 7 See attached 
hereto, 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 8 please provide 
copies of any exhibits you anticipate introducing at trial. 
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 8 I will 
supplement. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 9 Please provide 
copies of any documents or writings which reflect any 
outstanding indebtedness or obligation of The Outlaw Saloon. 
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 9 See attached 
hereto. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO, io Please provide 
copies of all paystubs or other documentation which evidences 
any compensation, direct or indirect, received by you from The 
Outlaw Saloon during 1994. 
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 10 Attached 
hereto. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO, 11 Please provide 
copies of all financial statements of The Outlaw Saloon 
prepared by Nate Knight Accounting, Clara Wilburg, or any 
other person or firm on behalf of you or The Outlaw Saloon. 
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 11 See attached 
hereto. 
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REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO, 12 Please provide 
a copy of any reports of stolen assets, as described in 
Interrogatory Number 15. 
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 12 S e e 
attached hereto. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 13 Please provide 
copies of any tax returns, annual or quarterly, for 1993 and 
1994, filed for either you personally or The Outlaw Saloon* 
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 13 S e e 
attached hereto. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 14 Please provide 
a copy of any appraisal, evaluation or assessment of the 
business of The Outlaw saloon, and/or the real property on 
which it is located, and Lot 95. 
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 14 T h e 
appraisal from Bob Muir was asked for. Sizes, facts and 
business figures were brought up but it was never completed. 
He passed away. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 15 Please provide 
a copy of any other documents identified in response to the 
Interrogatories set forth* 
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 15 Attached 
hereto. 
DATED this £fl"day of November, 1994. 
^ O A 6 E PAPPAS WHITE 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
county of Carbon ) 
CHERYL MONDERS, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and 
states that she is the Defendant in the above-entitled action; 
that she has read the above and foregoing and knows the 
contents thereof, and that the same is true and correct to the 
best of her knowledge, except as to those matters therein 
stated upon information and belief, and as to such matters 
believes the same to be true. 
[ERYL M0NE 
^YU^hM-
CHER O DERS 
Subscribed and sworn to before me thi^ day of 
November, 1994. 
/. '^leflsEfiaBo. Mtfile A /Minor 
My Commission Expires: IA/Iffft ^/?- <t<* 
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ADDENDUM C 
Plaintiffs Response to Defenant's 
Request for Admissions 
UYWalNttL 
JOANE PAPPAS WHITE #3445 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Fifth Street Plaza, Suite 1 
475 East Main 
Price, Utah 84501 
Telephone: (801) 637-0177 
IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CHERYL MONDERS, 
Plaintiff, 
Vs. 
KENNETH WAYNE MONDERS, 
Defendant. ] 
) PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO 
) DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR 
) ADMISSIONS 
i Civil No. 9447-8 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff, being first duly sworn upon 
oathf and hereby responds to Defendant's Requests for Admissions 
as follows: 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS 
ADMISSION NO, 1 Admit that the present 
business known as the Outlaw Saloon was commenced during the time 
of the marriage, and that both you and Defendant, KENNETH MONDERS, 
participated in the establishment of this business. 
ANSWER TO ADMISSION NO. 1 Denies Admission No. 1. 
ADMISSION NO. 2 Admit that you and KENNETH 
MONDERS entered into a contract providing for the establishment of 
the business, under the terms of which MR. MONDERS would own a 
fifty percent (50%) interest in the business. 
ANSWER TO ADMISSION NO. 2 Deny Admission No. 2. 
ADMISSION NO. 3 Admit that it is your belief 
that you have a valid option contract with MARVIN C. TANGREN, for 
the purchase of the real property adjoining the property on which 
the Outlaw Saloon is located, known as Lot 95, and that it is your 
belief that such contract is enforceable. 
ANSWER TO ADMISSION NO. 3 Admits that CHERYL MONDERS 
only has an agreement with MARVIN C. TANGREN for the purchase of 
real property adjoining the Outlaw Saloon which he has refused to 
honor. Admits that CHERYL MONDERS has one legal opinion which 
indicates that the contract may be enforceable but that the 
expenses associated with such a suit would run between TEN and 
FIFTEEN THOUSAND ($10,000 and $15,000) DOLLARS. Denies all of the 
balance of the allegations in Admission No. 3. 
ADMISSION NO. 4 Admit that you intend to pursue 
legal action to enable you to exercise the option agreement. 
ANSWER TO ADMISSION NO. 4 Deny Admission No. 4. 
ADMISSION NO. 5 Admit that Defendant is a party to 
the option agreement described in the preceding two paragraphs, and 
that such option agreement was entered into during the marriage 
between Plaintiff and Defendant. 
ANSWER TO ADMISSION NO. 5 Deny Admission No. 5. 
ADMISSION NO. 6 Admit that the value of the 
property which is the subject of the option agreement, is worth 
substantially more than the option price of $10,000 provided in 
paragraph 1 of such agreement. 
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ANSWER TO ADMISSION NO. 6 Objects to Admission No, 
6 on the grounds that it is an attempt to value the existing value 
of real estate as compared to an original option price for same 
many years ago during an economic depression and, therefore it is 
immaterial to the current proceedings. 
ADMISSION NO. 7 Admit that you are unwilling to 
sell the business known as "The Outlaw Saloon", together with the 
real estate on which the business is located, and your rights to 
the option agreement, for the total sum of $150,000. 
ANSWER TO ADMISSION NO. 7 The Plaintiff is unable to 
respond to Admission No. 7 on the grounds that no information 
concerning the alleged sale price has been made available with 
respect to methods of payments etc. and, therefore, same are 
denied. 
ADMISSION NO. 8 Admit that you are unwilling to 
sell the property described in the preceding paragraph, for the 
total sum of $175,000. 
ANSWER TO ADMISSION NO. 8 The Plaintiff is unable to 
respond to Admission No. 8 on the grounds that no information 
concerning the alleged sale price has been made available with 
respect to methods of payments etc. and, therefore, same are 
denied. 
ADMISSION NO. 9 Admit that you are unwilling to 
sell the property described in the preceding two paragraphs, for 
the total sum of $200,000. 
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ANSWER TO ADMISSION NO. 9 The Plaintiff is unable to 
respond to Admission No. 9 on the grounds that no information 
concerning the alleged sale price has been made available with 
respect to methods of payments etc. andf therefore, same are 
denied. 
DATED this xf ?^day of October, 1994. 
:ERYL MCftJDERS, PI 
4U-^ 
CHER laintiff 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this,^A \ jrfC day of 
October, 1994. 
r 
i 
i 
\ 
\ 
Notary Public , 
SHELL1A.ATWC0D I 
1C5 So. West Temple #4C01 
Celt Lake City. Utah 84101J 
J«'y Commission Exvszz \ 
^y^opiimissiottara>»i»fts: 1 
L M «••«• mm mm «a mm mm mm mm • « » •• •• « 
OTARYPUBLIC 
Residing At: 
n DATED this S^ I day of October, 1994. 
'A^LDM 
JOAJJE"JXPPAS WHITE 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
ADDENDUM D 
Trial Exhibit P-4 
50 
s| EXHHIT 
CHERYL'S ASSETS AT TIME OF MARRIAGE 
0 
1. cash in safety deposit box $ 9r090.00 
2. Savings at Williamsburg Bank 15,524.00 
3. IRA (opened 1978) 9f000.00 
4. Checking account 685.30 
5. 1 Krugerand 382.00 
6. Motel Stock 11,445.00 
7. Missouri Bond -10,000.00 
8. The First Outlaw Saloon (cost basis) 22.600.00 
(Value $50,000) 
TOTAL S78.726.30 
CHERYL'S SEPARATE ASSETS ACQUIRED AFTER MARRIAGE 
Inheritance from father (1988) 16,600 
Inheritance from mother 3#316 
in cash and payments of $183*00 
per month for seven years ($15,372) 18,688 
TOTAL 
PLUS ACCUMULATED INTEREST ON ALL ACCOUNTS FROM DATE OF MARRIAGE 
